Hastings Law Journal
Volume 24 | Issue 3

Article 2

1-1973

Hinson v. Delis: California Adopts the Implied
Warranty of Habitability
Robert M. Henderson

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Robert M. Henderson, Hinson v. Delis: California Adopts the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 24 Hastings L.J. 369 (1973).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol24/iss3/2

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository.

HINSON v. DELIS: CALIFORNIA ADOPTS THE
IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY
In Hinson v. Delis,1 decided in June, 1972, California joined the
growing list of jurisdictions which have found that a landlord impliedly
warrants the habitability of premises he rents.2 Hinson holds that a

tenant may now withhold rental payments when his landlord fails to
meet his statutory duty to maintain the premises substantially in accordance with either state or local housing regulations,3 and that thereafter the tenant will be liable only for the reasonable rental value of the

premises as determined by the court.4
This note will analyze briefly the reasons for sustaining an im-

plied warranty of habitability in light of prior California laws, 5 explore

the implications and significance of the Hinson decision, 6 and propose
that a quasi-judicial agency be created to provide an easily accessible

forum for the speedy resolution of rent withholding disputes.7

Hinson v. Delis
In November, 1968, tenant Hinson took possession of an apartment in the City of Richmond pursuant to a written month-to-month
rental agreement at a monthly rate of $90. The following November,
through no fault of Hinson, the bathroom floor began to weaken and a
hole soon developed, apparently the result of dry rot. Shortly there1. 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1972).
2. The holding in Hinson v. Delis applies to all hirings of dwellings used for
human occupancy. In the absence of an agreement on the subject, an oral hiring of
real property is presumed to be a month to month tenancy. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1944
(West 1954). Also, the terms lessee and tenant are used interchangeably, although
strictly speaking a lessee is a party to a formal lease. See Stone v. City of Los Angeles, 114 Cal. App. 192, 199, 299 P. 838, 841 (1931).
3. State housing law requires that the Department of Industrial Relations acting
through the Division of Housing shall promulgate and enforce housing rules and regulations for the protection of the health, safety and general welfare of the occupant.
CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 17921 (West Supp. 1972). The regulations may be found
in CAL. ADM. CODE, tit. 25, H9 1000-90. Local governments may also impose restrictions; however, local ordinances must impose the same requirements as the state
housing regulations. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 17958 (West Supp. 1972).
4. 26 Cal. App. 3d at 70, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
5. See text accompanying notes 33-71 infra.
6. See text accompanying notes 72-111 infra.
7. See text accompanying notes 112-125 infra.
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after Hinson notified the landlord's resident manager about the hole
and several other defects; 8 however, neither the landlord nor the manager did anything to fix any of the defects. Between November 1969
and March 1970, both Hinson and her 10-year-old son fell down in the
bathroom because of the hole in the floor. After her son fell, Hinson
told the manager that she would not pay her rent until the proper repairs were made. In response, the landlord's manager covered the hole
with the end of a wooden orange crate.
On March 3rd, 1970, at Hinson's request, a representative from
the City of Richmond inspected the apartment, 10 confirmed the defects
and found that they constituted violations of the Richmond Housing
Code. By this time Hinson, who could not herself afford to hire a
contractor to repair the defects," had withheld $200-slightly more
than two month's rent. Her landlord then served her with a three-day
notice to pay rent or quit the premises. A few days later Hinson filed
an action in superior court to enjoin the landlord's threatened eviction
action, and for a declaratory judgment that a tenant is obligated to pay
full rent only after the landlord has substantially complied with the
housing codes.1 2
Following a default by the landlord, the trial court decided that
8. In addition to the hole in the bathroom floor, the toilet leaked and caused
foul odors, the glass in the front door allowed a constant draft to enter the apart-

ment and the linoleum on the kitchen floor failed to provide a water-repellant surface.
26 Cal. App. 3d at 64, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 662.
9. In late November 1969, the tenant fell through the hole and allegedly hurt

her back. Between December 1, 1969, and the end of January 1970, she fell on two
other occasions due to the hole and on February 4, 1970, the tenant's ten-year-old
son fell in the bathroom because of the hole. Id.

10. Officers of local housing regulation enforcement agencies may inspect premises to secure compliance with or to prevent violations of the regulations. CAL. HEALTH
& S. CODE § 17970 (West 1964). After giving thirty days notice to the landlord to
abate any violations, the enforcement agency may bring any appropriate action or pro-

ceeding to alleviate the situation. Id. § 17980.

However the adequacy of the pres-

ent State Housing Law, id. §§ 17910-95, to secure and maintain suitable housing standards is questionable. See text accompanying notes 60-65 infra.

11. The cost of the repairs would have been more than $300. Hinson's sole
source of income from November 1, 1969 to April 1, 1970 was an Aid to Families
with Dependent Children (AFDC) monthly grant of $172 for her children and an
Aid to the Totally Disabled (ATD) monthly grant of $158 for herself. 26 Cal. App.
3d at 65, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 662.
12. Five days after Hinson had filed the action in superior court the landlord

received notice from the local housing representative of the defects.

Three days later

the landlord's manager made the repairs. The parties then entered an agreement that
during the pendency of the action the landlord would not attempt to evict the tenant

for nonpayment of the $200 withheld rent, and that the tenant would resume making
her regular monthly rent payments as of April 1, 1970.

Id. at 66, 102 Cal. Rptr. at

663. Therefore, the tenant's action to enjoin the threatened eviction was moot. Id.
at 68, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
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this was a proper case for declaratory relief"3 but ruled in favor of the
landlord, holding that a tenant has no legal or equitable right to withhold rent unilaterally.1 4 On appeal, the issue presented to the first district court of appeal was whether the duty of the tenant to pay rent
is dependent upon the landlord's duty to comply substantially with the
housing codes. Calling the issue one of first impression, the court
answered the question in the affirmative and held that the trial court
erred in rejecting the tenant's claim. 5
In support of its decision the appellate court first considered the
illegal contract theory and the doctrine of constructive eviction. The
rationale of the illegal contract theory is that where a contract is entered into for a prohibited purpose the contract is void and unenforceable. 6 The court notes cases in which the illegal contract theory is applied to declare void leases in which both parties knowingly made rental
agreements which violated local and state housing laws.17 However,
the court found this theory inapposite for two reasons. First, in Hinson
the defects which constituted violations of the housing codes became
apparent during the period of occupancy, whereas most of the illegal
contract cases involved agreements between the parties to waive patent
defects existing at the time the lease was executed. 18 Since the
defects in Hinson were not apparent at the time the parties entered into
the rental agreement, the court would not infer that the parties had
agreed to waive the housing code violations. Second, the tenants remedy under the illegal contract theory is to treat the tenancy as ended
because the lease is considered a nullity.' 9 Therefore, the court felt the
result of the illegal contract rationale-even if applicable-would defeat the wishes of a tenant such as Hinson who desired to remain in
possession of the premises.2 0
13. Id. at 66, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 664. See CAL. CODE Cirv. PROC. § 1060 (West
Supp. 1972).
14. 26 Cal. App. 3d at 66, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 663. The trial court, however, did
find the defects in Hinson's apartment to be substantial violations of the housing code.
Id.
15. Id. at 71, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 667.
16. Id. at 66, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
17. E.g., Howell v. City of Hamburg Co., 165 Cal. 172, 131 P. 130 (1913);
Shepard v. Lerner, 182 Cal. App. 2d 746, 6 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1960); Brown v. Southall
Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968).
18. But see 6 S. WiLtusToN, Tun LAW OF CONTRACrS § 1761 at 5000 (rev. ed.
1938) where it is stated that if the performance actually rendered by one seeking to
enforce a contract is itself forbidden by law, the fact that the contract was intended
for a lawful purpose will not justify recovery on the bargain if the illegality is more
than an incidental part of the performance.
19. See, e.g., cases cited note 17 supra. But see Diamond Housing Corp. v.
Robinson, 257 A.2d 492, 495 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969) (where lease declared unenforcible tenant became a tenant at sufferance).
20. 26 Cal. App. 3d at 68, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
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Similarly, the court noted that under the doctrine of constructive
eviction the tenant is required to abandon the premises within a reasonable time after giving notice of the defects to the landlord."
Although in recognition of the general scarcity of low-income housing2 2
some courts have dispensed with the requirement of abandonment and
have adopted a doctrine of partial constructive eviction, Judge Caldecott, writing for the Hinson court, stated that to continue the use of judicial
fictions would be unnecessary when preferable alternatives exist. 23
Guided by several decisions in other jurisdictions, 24 Judge Caldecott found a preferable alternative in the theory of implied warranty
of habitability. Quoting from a leading Wisconsin case, the court noted
that
the legislature has made a policy judgment-that it is socially (and
politically) desirable to impose [the duty to maintain the premises]
on a property owner. .

.

.

To follow the old rule of no implied

warranty of habitability in leases would, in our opinion, be inconsistent with the current legislative policy concerning housing stand25
ards ....
He concluded that the implied warranty theory permitted the most equi21. Id. at 69, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 665-66.
22. Hinson had actively looked for another place to live but was unsuccessful
due to the scarcity of low-income housing in the Richmond-San Pablo area. An affidavit by the City Manager of Richmond estimated that only forty standard vacant
units were available to low-income persons, and that the Housing Authority had more
than 400 applicants on its waiting list for these units. Id. at 65, 102 Cal. Rptr. at

662.
23. Id. at 69-70, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 664. The result produced by the partial constructive eviction theory, similar to the implied warranty of habitability, does not absolve the tenant from the entire rent obligation, but allows a substantial reduction, on
the theory that the tenant has been constructively evicted from only a portion of the
premises. See Note, Partial Constructive Eviction: The Common Law Answer in the
Tenants' Struggle for Habitability, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 417 (1970). However, with the
exception of a few New York decisions, this doctrine has not been widely accepted.
Id. at 429-31. As stated in Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 435, 462 P.2d 470, 475
(1969):
"In spite of such imaginative remedies, it appears to us that to search for
gaps and exceptions in a legal doctrine such as constructive eviction which exists only
because of the somnolence of the common law and the courts is to perpetuate further
judicial fictions when preferable alternatives exist."
24. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Marini
v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis.2d 590, 111
N.W.2d 409 (1961).
See also Bonner v. Beechem, CCH Pov. L. REP.
11,098
(Colo. County Ct., Denver, Feb. 20, 1970); Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill. 2d 351,
280 N.E.2d 208 (1972); Kline v. Burns, 276 A.2d 248 (N.H. Sup. Ct. 1971); Samuelson v. Quinones, 119 N.J. Super. 338, 291 A.2d 580 (App. Div. 1972).
25. 26 Cal. App. 3d at 68, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 665, quoting Pines v. Perssion, 14

Wis.2d 590, 595-96, 111 N.W.2d 409, 412-13 (1961).
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table remedy by requiring the tenant to pay the reasonable rental value
of the premises, as determined by the trial court, so long as the tenant
continues in possession and the housing code violations remain unrepaired.2 6 However, only substantial code violations that occur through

no fault of the tenant and which impair the habitability of the prem7

ises will entitle the tenant to a reduction in rent.1
Although Hinson was not an action for unlawful detainer, the decision implies that a tenant will now be able to assert the implied warranty theory as a defense in an unlawful detainer action based on nonpayment of rent. 28 This conclusion logically follows when one considers the definition of unlawful detainer. A tenant is guilty of unlawful detainer when he wrongfully defaults in rent and remains in possession after receiving three days' written notice from the landlord stating the amount which is due.29 Since Hinson provides that the tenant
is obliged to make rental payments only after the landlord substantially
complies with the housing codes, it follows that the tenant could not be
guilty of unlawful detainer because no rent is due until a reasonable
rental value is determined by the court.3 0
Hinson also makes possible an alternative approach where the
26. 26 Cal. App. 3d at 70, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
27. Id.
28. The court cited Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970), apparently approving the ruling "that implied warranty of habitability was available as a
defense to an unlawful detainer action." Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62,
70, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661, 666 (1972). The court also stated: "If the tenant claims that
all or a part of the rent is not due because of defects in the premises, the trial court
may, during the pendency of the action and at the request of either party, require
the tenant to make the rental payments at the contract rate into court as they
become due for as long as the tenant remains in possession. At the trial of the action the court can then determine how the rent paid into court should be distributed."
Id. at 71, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 666. See text accompanying notes 98-111 infra.
29. CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 1161(2) (West Supp. 1972). California courts generally have viewed unlawful detainer as a summary procedure intended to enable the
landlord to obtain possession quickly and consequently have been reluctant to allow
a tenant to defend in such actions. E.g., Union Oil Co. v. Chandler, 4 Cal. App. 3d 716,
721, 84 Cal. Rptr. 756, 760 (1970). However, California courts have begun to question the unawful detainer procedure when it prevents doing substantial justice between
the parties. E.g., Schweiger v. Superior Ct., 3 Cal. 3d 507, 476 P.2d 97, 90 Cal. Rptr.
729 (1970) (defense of retaliatory eviction allowed); Mendoza v. Small Claims Ct.,
49 Cal. 2d 668, 321 P.2d 9 (1958) (denial of the tenant's right to counsel in an action for possession is violative of due process); Mihans v. Municipal Ct., 7 Cal. App.
3d 479, 87 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1970) (holding unconstitutional CAL. CODE Civ. PROc.
§ 1166(a) (West 1955) which permitted a landlord to recover possession for nonpayment of rent upon a showing by affidavit of the tenant's insolvency without entitling the tenant to his "day in court"; Abstract Inv. Co. v. Hutchinson, 204 Cal.
App. 2d 242, 22 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1962) (defense of racial discrimination allowed).
30. See generally Marini v. Ireland, 56 NJ. 130, 265 A.2d 526 (1970) for a dispussion of the implied warranty theory as a defense in unlawful detainer.
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tenant is reluctant to withhold rent because he is unsure whether the
defects in the premises constitute a breach of the implied warranty of

habitability.3 1 In such a situation he may bring a declaratory judgment action in superior court to determine the proper reduction in rent,
if any, that is warranted.3 2
Hinson v. Delis represents a substantial change in California law.
Before exploring further the impact of this change, it may be helpful
to examine briefly the development of the law leading up to the implied warranty of habitability.
From Caveat Emptor to the Implied Warranty of Habitability
Since feudal times a lease has been regarded as a conveyance of
an interest in land.13 Consequently, the law implied a covenant by
the lessor that he would deliver possession 34 and in return the tenant
was obligated to pay rent.3 5 Thus, if a tenant actually was deprived
of possession of all or part of the demised premises, his obligation to
pay rent ceased because there was a failure of the consideration for
which the rent was to be paid. 6 Similarly, there developed an implied
covenant that the landlord would not interfere with the lessee's use of
the demised premises-commonly
referred to as an implied covenant of
"quiet enjoyment. '3 7 If a landlord breached the implied covenant of
"quiet enjoyment" his tenant could abandon the premises on the theory
that he had been "constructively evicted.1 38 Again, after the tenant
31. See text accompanying notes 124-25 infra.
32. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1060 (West Supp. 1972) provides in part: "Any
person . . . who desires a declaration of his rights or duties . . . in respect to . . .
property . . . may, in cases of actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties
of the respective parties, bring an original action in the superior court . . . for a declaration of his rights and duties in the premises. . . . Such declaration may be had
before there has been any breach of the obligation in respect to which said declaration is sought."
33. 2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
221[1], at 178 (P. Rohan ed.
1971).
34. Id.
225[1], at 228.
35. See Quinn & Phillips, The Law of Landlord-Tenant: A Critical Evaluation of
the Past with Guidelines for the Future, 38 FORDHAM L. REv. 225, 228 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Quinn & Phillips].
36. See Fifth Ave. Bldg. Co. v. Kernochan, 221 N.Y. 370, 117 N.E. 579 (1917)
and cases cited therein.
37. 2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
225[31, at 232-40 (P. Rohan
ed. 1971).
38. Dyett v. Pendleton, 8 Cow. 727 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1827) was the first case to
recognize the doctrine of constructive eviction.
Under this doctrine the tenant was required to abandon the premises within a reasonable time following the
landlord's breach of the implied covenant, or he would be deemed to have waived the
breach. 2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1 225[3], at 239 n.28 (P. Rohan
ed. 1971).

February 1973]

IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY

375

abandoned the premises his obligation to pay rent ceased because the

rent obligation was deemed to issue out of the land.
However, the concept of caveat emptor shaped the background of
the law governing the condition and maintenance of the premises.
Hence, the landlord was under no duty to put or maintain the premises
in a fit condition. The tenant took the premises as they were and assumed all risks as to their condition.39
In 1872, with the adoption of Civil Code sections 194140 and
1942, 41 California altered considerably the common law position on

the duty of the landlord to make repairs. As originally enacted, section
1941 provided that in a lease of a dwelling for human occupancy the
lessor was under a duty to maintain the premises in a habitable condition.

42

As originally enacted, section 1942 permitted a tenant to repair
any dilapidations that the lessor ought to repair and deduct the cost
from the rent, or otherwise recover it from the lessor.43

Perhaps fear-

ful that section 1942 as originally enacted would permit a mischievous
tenant to repair himself into a splendid home at the cost of his landlord,44 the legislature in 1874 amended section 1942 to restrict the
amount a tenant could deduct for the cost of repairs to one month's
rent; however, the tenant was given the alternative of vacating the premises, in which case he was discharged from further obligations under the
lease.45
39. 2 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 1 233, at 300 (P. Rohan ed.
1971). The landlord was not liable for injuries to the tenant or to third persons sustained because of the condition of the premises. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
TORTS § 63, at 400 (4th ed. 1971). See generally Quinn & Phillips, supra note 35
for a discussion of the common law rules concerning landlord-tenant relations.
40. CAL. Crv. CODE § 1941 (Crocker 1872).
41. Id. § 1942.
42. Id. § 1941 provided: "The lessor of a building intended for the occupation
of human beings must put it into a condition fit for that purpose, and repair all subsequent dilapidations thereof, except such as are [occasioned by the lessee's ordinary
negligence]." Shortly after its enactment, this section was amended to permit the parties to a lease to waive the landlord's duty to repair. AMENDMENTS TO THE CALiFORNIA CODES § 205 at 245-46 (20th Sess. 1873-74). However, a recently added
section provides that such agreements are void and contrary to public policy unless
the parties agree in writing that the lessee shall undertake to repair all or part of the
premises as part of the consideration for the rental. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942.1 (West
Supp. 1972).
43. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1942 (Crocker 1872) provided: "If, within a reasonable
time after notice to the lessor, of dilapidations which he ought to repair, he neglects
to do so, the lessee may repair the same himself, and deduct the expenses of such
repairs from the rent, or otherwise recover it from the lessor."
44. See Comment, Landlord and Tenant: Repairing the Duty to Repair, 11
SANTA CLARA LAw. 298, 301-04 (1971).
45. AMmNDMES'S TO THE CALIFORNIA CODES § 206 at 246 (20th Sess. 1873-74).
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Despite the enactment of these statutes,4 6 California courts continued for nearly one hundred years to follow the common law rule
that in the absence of fraud, concealment or an express covenant, a landlord was under no duty to repair the leased premises. 4' For example, in
Moroney v. Hellings,4 s decided in 1895, the landlord brought an unlawful detainer action against his tenant for nonpayment of rent. The
tenant remained in possession and pleaded as a defense the allegedly
dilapidated conditions of the premises as an offset to the rent. The
court stated that no findings were necessary upon the tenant's defense
since the lessee's exclusive remedies were those provided in section
1942. 49
California courts generally also have held that under the doctrine
of independent covenants, even where the landlord breaches an express
covenant to repair, the tenant remains obligated to pay rent so long
as he remains in possession, unless the covenant to repair was exAs amended, CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942 (West 1954) provided: "If within a reasonable
time after notice to the lessor, of dilapidations which he ought to repair, he neglects to
do so, the lessee may repair the same himself, where the cost of such repairs do not
require an expenditure greater than one month's rent of the premises, and deduct
the expenses of such repairs from the rent, or the lessee may vacate the premises, in
which case he shall be discharged from further payment of rent, or performance of
other conditions." A 1970 amendment to this section has restricted the exercise of
the repair and deduct remedy to once every twelve-month period. See text accompanying note 67 infra.
46. It is interesting to note that the writers of the original section 1941 in explaining the intent of the legislature in requiring a landlord to ensure that the premises
were livable, stated that: "This section changes the rule upon this subject to conform to
that which, notwithstanding steady judicial adherence for hundreds of years to the adverse doctrine, is generally believed by the unprofessional public to be law, and upon
which basis they almost always contract. The very fact that there are repeated decisions to the contrary, down to the year eighteen hundred and sixty-one, shows that the
public do not and cannot understand their justice, or even realize their existence. So
familiar a point of law could not arise again and again for adjudication were it not
that the community at large revolt [sic] at every application of the rule." Note to
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1941 (Crocker 1872).
47. E.g., Gately v. Campbell, 124 Cal. 520, 57 P. 567 (1899); Metcalf v.
Chiprin, 217 Cal. App. 2d 305, 31 Cal. Rptr. 571 (1963); Farber v. Greenberg, 98 Cal.
App. 675, 277 P. 534 (1929).
48. 110 Cal. 219, 42 P.560 (1895).
49. Id. at 221, 42 P. at 560. The same line of reasoning was set forth in Farber
v. Greenberg, 98 Cal. App. 675, 682, 277 P. 534, 537 (1929): "In the absence of an
express covenant by the landlord to repair, sections 1941 and 1942 control; and in such
case it is held that the statutory liability of the lessor declared in section 1941 is limited by the provisions of section 1942, so that for failure to repair, the lessee has either one of two remedies, viz.: (a) Treat the failure to repair as a breach of the lease
and vacate the premises; (b) Himself make the repairs at the expense of the landlord,
after notice to him, provided they do not entail an expenditure of more than one
month's rent."

February 1973]

IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY

pressly or impliedly a condition precedent to the coveant to pay rent.60
However, the courts have been willing to construe covenants contained
where they go to the very root of
in a lease as mutually dependent
51
the consideration for the lease.
Rationale for Implying a Warranty
of Habitability in California
Despite the strong influence of the caveat emptor philosophy on
California landlord-tenant law, the Hinson court, in an opinion perhaps as noteworthy for the summary fashion by which it reached the
conclusion as for the result actually reached, willingly adopted the implied warranty theory. Although the court in Hinson did not discuss
Civil Code sections 1941 and 1942, the more recent case of Ball v.
Tobeler,52 in which the second district court of appeal approvingly followed Hinson, did discuss these sections. In Ball the court recognized that previous decisions had held that a tenant's remedies for improperly maintained housing were limited by section 1942. 53 Evidently persuaded by much recent commentary on the plight of the lowincome tenant,5 4 the court stated that sections 1941 and 1942 defined
only the self-help remedies available to a tenant and were not intended
Lo embody all of the relief which the law should afford a tenant living
in substandard housing. 55
Furthermore, most of the California decisions holding that section
1941 did not alter the common law to any extent greater than the
remedies provided in section 1942 were decided before housing codes
were generally adopted in California." Thus, the courts in both Hin50. See Arnold v. Krigbaum, 169 Cal. 143, 145, 146 P. 423, 424 (1915). See
generally Comment, Plotting the Long-Overdue Death of Caveat Emptor in Leased
Housing, 6 U.S.F. L. REv. 147 (1972) for a discussion of the origin and growth of the
doctrine of independent covenents.
51. See Medico-Dental Bldg. Co. v. Horton & Converse, 21 Cal. 2d 411, 418-19,
132 P.2d 457, 462 (1942); Groh v. Kover's Bull Pen, Inc. 221 Cal. App. 2d 611, 614,
34 Cal. Rptr. 637, 639 (1963) (express covenant to repair the roof held dependent).
52. 2 Civil No. 38424 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App., filed Sept. 13, 1972).
53.

Id. at 10-11 citing Metcalf v. Chiprin, 217 Cal. App. 2d 305, 31 Cal. Rptr.

571 (1963); Farber v. Greenberg, 98 Cal. App. 675, 277 P. 534 (1929).
54. In Ball v. Tobeler, 2 Civ. No. 38424 at 14, the court cited Loeb, The LowIncome Tenant in California: A Study in Frustration, 21 HASTINGS LJ. 287 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Loeb]; Note, Judicial Expansion of Tenant's Private Law Rights:
Implied Warranties of Habitability and Safety in Residential Urban Leases, 56 CoRNuEL L. REv. 489 (1971); Comment, Landlord and Tenant: Repairing the Duty to
Repair, 11 SANTA CLA A LAw. 298 (1971); Comment, The Tenant ls a Consumer, 3
U.C. DA Vs L Rav. 59 (1971).
55. Ball v. Tobeler, 2 Civ. No. 38424 at 13.

56. But see Metcalf v. Chiprin, 217 Cal. App. 2d 305, 309, 31 Cal. Rptr. 571,
574 (1963) where the second district court of appeal held the housing code did not cre-
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son and Ball felt that to continue to follow these cases would be inconsistent with the current legislative policy concerning housing stand7
ards.

5

Perhaps the most noteworthy case implying a warranty of habitability on which the Hinson and Ball courts relied is Javins v. First
National Realty Corp.55 Judge J. Skelly Wright, writing for the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, noted that, although the legislature had declared a need for adequate housing, enforcement of housing regulations had been far from effective and that
deplorable conditions in rental housing persisted in the District of Columbia and in the nation. Therefore, the common law rule that the

landlord was under no duty to repair no longer could be justified in a

modern urban society. 59
The reasons that persuaded the District of Columbia court to
adopt the implied warranty of habitability theory apply with equal
force in California. Quite often the low-income tenant in California
ate any rights or duties between landlord and tenant. However in light of Ball v.
Tobeler, also decided by the second district court, Metcalf should be considered overruled on that point.
57. Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d at 68-69, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 665; Ball v.
Tobeler, 2 Civ. No. 38424 at 14-17. Although the implied warranty of habitability
theory previously had not been adopted in California, but see Buckner v. Azulai, 251
Cal. App. 2d 1013, 59 Cal. Rptr. 806 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1967) (dictum), California courts recently have begun to hold in tort cases that both the State Housing Law
and local housing codes impose a duty on the landlord to properly maintain and repair
rented premises. E.g., Grant v. Hipsher, 257 Cal. App. 2d 375, 64 Cal. Rptr. 892
(1967) (local housing ordinance); Ewing v. Balan, 168 Cal. App. 2d 619, 336 P.2d
561 (1959) (State Housing Law).
In McNally v. Ward, Justice Tobriner, then writing for the first district court of
appeal, held that a city housing ordinance imposed upon the landlord a duty to repair.
192 Cal. App. 2d 871, 14 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1961). In McNally, the tenant had been injured due to the landlord's failure to inspect and repair a defective railing. The landlord
relied on the holding in Gately v. Campbell, 124 Cal. 520, 523, 57 P. 567, 568 (1899),
that "the only consequence of a breach of the landlord's obligation [as imposed by
Civil Code section 1941] is that the tenant may either vacate the premises or expend
one month's rent on repairs." Rejecting this argument, Justice Tobriner pointed out
that the tenant did not rely on section 1941 but contended that the very enactment of
the ordinance demonstrated that the city intended that the duty of the landlord to repair be extended to protect the class of persons of which she was a member. 192 Cal.
App. 2d at 877, 14 Cal. Rptr. at 264. He continued that if the only effect on tenants of
the housing ordinance was to establish their right to repair and deduct the cost, the
ordinance would be pointless in view of Civil Code sections 1941 and 1942. Id. In
light of this trend, the court in Hinson took the next step in holding that the landlord's
duty to repair as imposed by the housing codes is a condition precedent to the tenant's duty to pay rent.
58. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970), noted in
39 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 152 (1970), cited with approval in Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal,
App. 3d at 70, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 666 and Ball v. Tobeler, 2 Civ. No. 38424 at 14.
59. 428 F.2d at 1082.
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lives in substandard housing.60 Despite the fact that the State Housing
Law6 1 requires local housing departments to enforce the regulations
promulgated thereunder,62 the tenant often is confronted with confusion when seeking help from the agencies charged with enforcement responsibility because the agencies frequently are understaffed and inefficiently organized. 63 Furthermore, enforcement responsibility often
is divided between various departments within the agencies, each having jurisdiction over particular code violations.6 4 Also, because numerous hearings are required at different levels within the agencies before action can be taken, even when the tenant contacts the appropriate
department within the bureaucratic morass, a recalcitrant landlord usually can avoid compliance for a long period of time. 65
The remedies afforded the tenant under the repair and deduct
statute also are inadequate. The tenant is able to make only relatively
minor repairs because the amount he may deduct is limited to one
month's rent.6 6 In 1970 the state legislature further restricted this remedy by providing that a tenant may expend a month's rent on repairs
only once within any twelve-month period.6 7 Due to the scarcity of
adequate low-income housing, the alternative remedy of vacating the
premises also provides no real solution to a tenant living in a dwelling
which is below the habitability standards required by law.
The inadequacy of the tenant's remedies absent the implied warranty is particularly undesirable, for as noted by Judge Wright in
Javins:
When American city dwellers, both rich and poor, seek "shelter" today, they seek a well known package of goods and servicesa package which includes not merely walls and ceilings, but also
60. See Loeb, supra note 54 at 287.
61. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE §§ 17910-95 (West 1964).
62. Id. § 17961 (West Supp. 1972).
63. See Loeb, supra note 54, at 293-96.
64. For example, in San Francisco, electrical problems come under the jurisdiction
of the Electrical Inspection Division of the Bureau of Building Inspection of the Department of Public Works, while plumbing problems are under the jurisdiction of the
Plumbing Inspection Division. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ELECTRICAL CODE § 601 (1968);
This creSAN FRANCISCO, CAL., PLUMBING & GAS APPLIANCE CODE § 201 (1970).
ates the possibility of the tenant being referred back and forth in situations where,
because of the nature of the defect, it is not clear what department has jurisdiction.
65. See, e.g., Loeb, supra note 54, at 295 n.36. Problems also arise because the
major enforcement mechanism employed by the agencies is abatement through the eviction of all the tenants, and possibly, demolition of the building. Id. at 294. Needless to say this only can have disastrous consequences for a tenant in need of a suitable place to live.
66. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942(a) (West Supp. 1972). See text accompanying notes
40-45 supra.
67. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1942(a) (West Supp. 1972).
68. See note 22 supra.
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adequate heat, light and ventilation, serviceable plumbing facilities,
secure windows and doors, proper sanitation, and proper maintenance.6 9
Noting that implied warranties of fitness of use and merchantability are well established in the law of sales, even with regard to sales
of real property,7" Judge Caldecott approvingly quoted from the Jayins opinion: "Contract principles established in other areas of law provide a more rational framework for the apportionment of landlordtenant responsibilities; they strongly suggest that a warranty
of habit71
ability be implied into all contracts for urban dwellings."
Implementing Hinson v. Delis
The decision in Hinson v. Delis leaves a number of questions unanswered. The court set forth no clear test for determining what type
of defects would be sufficiently material to warrant a reduction in rent,
nor did the court offer any guidelines for determining the reasonable
value of defective premises. The court also stated that the tenant
must notify the landlord of the defects before he may withhold rent
and also that the trial court may order the tenant to pay the rent into
court during the pendency of the action. This section will examine
each of these elements of the decision.
What Is a Material Breach?
The standard of habitability which the landlord is deemed to warrant is governed by the applicable housing codes.7 2 Judge Caldecott
stated in Hinson that in determining the materiality of an alleged
breach, both the seriousness of the claimed defect and its duration
should be considered. Minor housing code violations which do not
affect habitability must be considered de minimus.7 3 Thus, where the
tenant withholds rent in the erroneous belief that he is entitled to a reduction in rent, judgment for possession will be entered for the land74
lord.
69. 428 F.2d at 1074.
70. 26 Cal. App. 3d at 70, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 666. The same public policy reasons of fairness that have convinced courts to protect the consumer's legitimate expectations apply with equal force in the area of landlord-tenant relations. See Comment, The Tenant as a Consumer, 3 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 59 (1971).
71. 26 Cal. App. 3d at 70, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 666, quoting Javins v. First Nat'l
Realty Corp., 428 F.2d at 1080.
72. Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 71, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661, 666-67 (1972);
Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1072 (D.C. Cir.).
73. 26 Cal. App. 3d at 70, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 666; accord, Javins v. First Nat'l
Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1082 n.63 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
74. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
However this result apparently has been changed by statute in the District of Colum-
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Although the cases dealing with the implied warranty of habitability have not made clear what test the trier of fact should utilize to determine whether an alleged breach is material, rat infestation, 75 defective plumbing, heating and wiring,7 improper grading of a driveway resulting in the premises being flooded, 77 and a hole in the bathroom floor 78 have each been held sufficient to constitute a breach of the
implied warranty of habitability. Where the line will be drawn remains
to be determined by case law; however, in Academy Spires, Inc. v.
Brown,7 9 it was held that lack of painting, leaky faucets and defective
venetian blinds may be unpleasant but are not within the category of
uninhabitability and should not be considered for the purpose of reducing the tenant's rental obligation."0
California Civil Code section 1941.181 provides that a dwelling is
untenantable for purposes of section 194182 if it substantially lacks:
effective waterproofing and weather protection, including unbroken
windows; properly maintained plumbing facilities; an approved water
supply capable of producing hot and cold running water which is connected to an approved sewage system; approved and properly maintained electrical lighting equipment; generally sanitary conditions at
the commencement of the lease or rental agreement; an adequate number of receptacles for garbage and rubbish; or properly maintained
floors, stairways, and ceilings.
Section 1941.1 may serve as a useful preliminary guide for determing what types of housing code violations may affect habitability
but the section should not be considered an exhaustive list. The State
Housing Regulations83 impose many standards for the construction and
maintenance of dwellings for the purpose of protecting the health and
safety of the occupants, not all of which are specifically enumerated in
section 1941.1.84 Certainly the landlord would also be in breach of
bia. Now if the tenant withholds rent in a good faith but erroneous belief that the
landlord is in breach of the implied warranty, he should be able to remain in possession if he subsequently pays all of the rent that is determined to be due. See DisRIacr
OF COLUMBIA LANDLORD-TENANT REG. § 2910(c) (reproduced in H.J. Daniels, Judicial
and Legislative Remedies for SubstandardHousing: Landlord-TenantLaw Reform in the
District of Columbia, 59 Guo. L.. 909, 960 (1971)). See notes 124 & 125 and accompanying text infra.
75. Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969).
76. Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111 N.W. 2d 409 (1961).
77. See Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969).
78. Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1972).
79. 111 N.J. Super. 477, 268 A.2d 556 (1970).
80. Id. at 482-83, 268 A.2d at 559.
81. CAL. CIrv. CODE § 1941.1 (West Supp. 1972).
82. Id. § 1941 (West 1954).
83. CAL. ADM. CODE, tit. 25, H9 1000-90.
84. E.g., id. § 1082-84 impose minimum requirements for fire protection facilities and equipment; id. § 1086 imposes minimum excavation and grading requirements.
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the implied warranty if he substantially violated any of these regulations and such violation impaired the habitability of the premises.
What Is the Reasonable Value of
Substandard Premises?
The courts that have adopted the implied warranty of habitability theory have been reluctant to hold that the tenant is absolved from
paying all rent because to do so would give the tenant "something for
nothing." 5 Thus, these courts have held that the tenant remains liable
for the "reasonable rental value" of the premises while the violations
exist. s6
Methods for determining what constitutes reasonable value remain to be formulated by case law. However, the approach taken in
a recent New Jersey decision is worth noting. In Academy Spires, Inc.
v. Brown,"7 the court held that the landlord's failure to supply heat,
hot water, garbage disposal or elevator service to a ninth story apartment constituted a breach of the implied warranty of habitability and
that therefore those defects should be considered in determining the
proper reduction in rent.8 8 The tenant produced no expert testimony
to show the fair value of the premises. Rather, the tenant urged that
the rent be lowered by a percentage equal to the percentage by which
the defects reduced the tenant's use of the premises.8 9 In adopting
this percentage reduction approach, the court noted that triers of fact
daily translate personal injuries into money damages with relatively
imprecise guidelines without violating the requirement that damages
be determined with reasonable certainty. 90 The court indicated that
any benefit derived from the use of expert testimony would be outweighed by the cost of such testimony which would place an extreme
burden on the typical low-income tenant, 91 and concluded that a 25
92
percent reduction was a fair adjustment of the tenant's rent.
The percentage reduction approach followed in Brown prevents a
landlord from arguing that the agreed rate of rent is the "reasonable
rental value" of the premises even with the defects. Considering the
85. See, e.g., Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 I1. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208 (1972).
But see Bonner v. Beechem, CCH Pov. L. REP. I 11,098 (Colo. County Ct., Denver,
Feb. 20, 1970), where the court held there was a total failure of consideration and that
therefore no rent was due.
86. E.g., Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 70, 102 Cal. Rptr. 661, 666

(1972).
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

111 N.J. Super. 477,
Id. at 482, 268 A.2d
Id. at 485, 268 A.2d
Id. at 486, 268 A.2d
Id. at 487, 268 A.2d
Id. at 488, 268 A.2d

268 A.2d 556 (1970).
at 559.
at 561.
at 561.
at 562.
at 562.
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scarcity of low-income housing,93 it is entirely possible that the fair
market value of defective premises might equal, and in some cases
exceed, the contract rate. The Brown approach, however, makes the
contract rate the starting figure which must be reduced by some percentage if the defects complained of constitute a material breach of the
implied warranty of habitability.
This approach is desirable since the underlying social policy is
not only to insure that the tenant pays no more rent than is reasonable,
but also to encourage the landlord to comply with housing regulations.
The percentage reduction method of determining the reasonable rent
appears to serve both purposes by ensuring that a tenant's rent obligation will be reduced when a material breach occurs, thus motivating
the landlord to make the necessary repairs. 94
The Notice Requirement

In Hinson v. Delis the court made clear that before a tenant may
withhold rent he must give notice of the alleged defects to the landlord and allow a reasonable time for the repairs to be made.95 Presumably the court imposed this requirement out of a sense of fairness
to the landlord and to obviate the court's consideration of matters which
might be resolved by the parties without court intervention. Thus,
the fact of notice is an element of the implied warranty of habitability
defense.
The notice requirement makes it more probable that continuing
defects are the product of the landlord's willful failure to make repairs.
Furthermore, this requirement does not seem to impose a significant
burden on the tenant since it seems unlikely generally that a tenant
would begin withholding rent because of "substantial" defects in the
96
premises without first asking his landlord to make repairs.
93. See notes 22 & 60 and accompanying text supra.
94. If the landlord continues to fail to make the repairs, the tenant should seek
injunctive relief arguing that the landlord is engaged in a business practice which is
both unlawful and unfair and that therefore injunctive relief is appropriate. See CAL.
CIM. CODE § 3369 (West 1970). The court in Ball v. Tobeler accepted this argument stating "[tihe reasoning of ilinson places a tenant in a position akin to that of a
consumer. The sweeping language of section 3369 of the Civil Code embraces the unlawful practice of a landlord as alleged. . . . Consequently, the [tenants'] allegations
sufficiently state a cause of action for injunctive relief under section 3369 ..
"
2
Civ. No. 38424 at 20 (Cal. Dist Ct. App., filed Sept. 13, 1972).
95. 26 Cal. App. 3d at 70, 102 CaL Rptr. at 666.
96. Where the landlord denies that notification or knowledge of the defects, a
strong argument can be made that there should be a presumption affecting the burden
of proof that the landlord had notice. Certainly once the tenant shows that before he
began withholding rent substantial defects existed for a length of time sufficient for
them to be repaired, it is reasonable to infer that the tenant had asked the landlord
to make the repairs. Where proof of a fact renders the inference of the existence of
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In Hinson the court did not specify any particular means by which
the landlord must be notified. However, in discussions with legal service attorneys it was pointed out that the landlord associations may
seek legislation requiring the tenant to give written notice of the defects
before he may withhold rent. 97 If the real reason for a notice requirement is to ensure that the landlord has knowledge of the defects,
another fact so highly probable that it is sensible to assume the truth of that other fact,
courts generally raise a presumption of the existence of that other fact. C. McCoRMICK, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 343 at 806-07 (E. Cleary ed., 2d ed. 1972).
CAL.
EVID. CODE § 605 (West 1966) states that a presumption affecting the burden of proof
is proper when it implements some public policy other than simply to facilitate the determination of the particular action in which it is applied. A presumption that the
landlord has notice of defects would implement the public policy declared by the legislature that unsafe and unsanitary dwelling accomodations are contrary to the public interest. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE §§ 33250-51 (West Supp. 1972). Furthermore, the
landlord is already under a duty to inspect the premises in order to prevent injury to
the tenant or third persons. McNally v. Ward, 192 Cal. App. 2d 871, 14 Cal. Rptr.
260 (1961).
97. As evidence of landlords' apparent ability to secure favorable legislation limiting a judicial decision in this area of the law, compare CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942.5
(West Supp. 1972) with Schweiger v. Superior Ct., 3 Cal. 3d 507, 476 P.2d 97, 90
Cal. Rptr. 729 (1970). In Schveiger the California Supreme Court upheld the defense of retaliatory eviction in an unlawful detainer action. In that case the landlord
had raised the rent in retaliation to the tenant exercising his rights under the repair and deduct statute. The Supreme Court reasoned that to permit this type of retaliation would unduly frustrate the self-help remedy of CAL. CIV. CODE § 1942. CAL. CiV.
CODE § 1942.5, which was added by the 1970 legislature, limits the availability of the
defense provided in Schweiger in two respects: it is available only once in any
twelve-month period and it is available only within sixty days of the event which
prompted the retaliation. See Note: Retaliatory Eviction as a Defense to Unlawful Detainer-AlternativeApproaches, 22 HASTINGs L.J. 1365 (1971).
The decision in Hinson v. Delis raises a similar question where a tenant withholds
rent: may a landlord terminate a month to month tenancy by giving the tenant thirty
days notice as provided by CAL. CIV. CODE § 1946 (West. Supp. 1972) and then
bring an unlawful detainer action pursuant to CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1161(5) (West
1972) if the tenant holds over after the tenancy has been thus terminated. Clearly
if this type of action is allowed we would have the anomalous situation that if a landlord served a three day notice and brought an action for possession for default in rent
the tenant could defend on the basis of Hinson; but if the landlord served a thirty day
notice on the tenant, the tenant would have no defense at all. Because most lowincome housing is let on a month to month basis, this type of retaliatory action would
undermine Hinson's impact for the class of tenants most likely to benefit from the
decision.
This precise problem recently has been resolved in the District of Columbia in
favor of permitting the tenant to defend an eviction proceeding by showing that it was
brought to retaliate for the tenant's assertion of his rights under the implied warranty
theory by withholding rent. Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., 463 F.2d 853 (D.C.
Cir. 1972). As California courts have followed the guidance of the District of Columbia both on retaliatory eviction, see Schweiger v. Superior Ct., and its principal
reliance upon Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1016 (1969), and the implied warranty theory, see text accompanying notes 58
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the way in which he learns that he is violating the law should have no
effect whatever on a tenant's assertion of his rights. Furthermore,
since it is unlikely that a tenant would withhold rent because of substantial defects without first informing his landlord of the condition,
it is doubtful that requiring written notice would further the purpose
of the notice requirement. Thus, if written notice is required, it would
permit a landlord to defeat an otherwise valid defense on a mere technicality and would unnecessarily preclude consideration of the merits
of the tenant's claim.
The Landlord's Protective Order
With the growing trend to permit tenants to raise certain defenses
in unlawful detainer actions, the need to protect the landlord is apparent. He has lost the advantage of the summary proceeding and is instead exposed to the possibility of prolonged litigation, during which
the tenant may remain in possession without paying rent. Furthermore, even a landlord found not to be in breach of the implied warranty
may be unable to collect back rent from a tenant who has spent the
withheld rent and who is now insolvent. Thus, the longer the proceeding, the more the landlord stands to lose.
In recognition of this danger and also of the possibility that a tenant might withhold rent without good cause, the courts in the District
of Columbia9 s have devised a method, adopted by the court in Hinson,99 to protect the landlord from unjustified losses. During the pendency of an action, upon the request of either party, the tenant may be
required to pay rent at the contract rate into court as it becomes due,
as long as the tenant remains in possession of the allegedly defective
premises. At the conclusion of the trial, the money paid into court
will be distributed in accordance with the findings of the court. 10 0
and 59 supra, it is reasonable to suppose that California courts also will follow the
District's example on this question.
It also should be noted that CAL. Civ. CODE § 1942.5 is applicable only when a
tenant has either exercised his rights under the civil code or has notified a housing
agency of the defects. Since a tenant withholding rent pursuant to Hinson is not exercising any rights granted by the civil code, the limitations imposed upon the retaliatory eviction defense by section 1942.5 should not apply.
98. Bell v. Tsintolas Realty Co., 430 F.2d 474, 481-82 and nn.18 & 21 (D.C.

Cir. 1970); Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1083 n.67 (D.C. Cir.
1970).
99. 26 Cal. App. 3d at 71, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
100. Id. It should be noted that, at least in the District of Columbia, this applies
only to future payments and not to back rents already due but unpaid. Bell v. Tsintolas
Realty Co., 430 F.2d at 483. The reason given in Bell was that to require back rent
alleged to be due would depart from the protective purpose of the order and would
be in the nature of a penalty, since in the District of Columbia a landlord cannot recover
back rent in a suit for possession. Id. However in California the landlord may re-
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Recognizing that "such a protective order represents a noticeable
break with the ordinary processes of civil litigation, in which, as a general rule, the plaintiff has no advance assurance of the solvency of the
defendant,"'' 1 the court in Bell v. Tsintolas Realty Co. emphasized that
the order should be entered only upon proper motion and after notice
and opportunity for a hearing on the motion. 0 2
In Hinson the court did not give any guidelines to help trial courts
in determining when to issue the order. However, the federal appeals
court in Bell offered the following suggestions:
In making a determination of [the landlord's] need [for the
protective order], the trial court may properly consider the amount
of rent alleged to be due, the number of months the landlord has
not received even a partial rental payment, the reasonableness of
the rent for the premises, the amount of the landlord's monthly
obligations for the premises, whether the tenant has been allowed to
proceed in forma pauperis, and whether the landlord faces a substantial threat of foreclosure.
Even if the landlord has adequately demonstrated his need
for a protective order, the trial judge must compare that need
with the apparent merits of the defense based on housing code violations. Relevant considerations would be whether the housing code
violations alleged are de minimus or substantial, whether the landlord has been notified of the existence of the defects and, if so,
his response to that notice, and the date, if known,
of the last re03
pair or renovation relating to the alleged defect.'
The court added that in certain instances the trial court should
order deposited in court an amount less than the contract rate. 10 4 For
example, when there is a very strong showing of housing code violations,' 0 5 an order to deposit an amount less than the contract rate
cover rent which is already due in the action for possession.

§ 1174 (West Supp. 1972).

CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc.

Therefore it would seem that in California there is no

reason to limit the application of the protective order only to future payments.
101. Bell v. Tsintolas Realty Co., 430 F.2d at 479.

102. Id. at 483. In the absence of a hearing on the motion, entry of an order
is at least a questionable procedure. Cf. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S.
337 (1969), holding violative of procedural due process a Wisconsin statute which
provided for prejudgment garnishment of wages.

Although the court in Bell did not dis-

cuss the matter in detail, it obviously was concerned with possible violation of the
tenant's constitutional rights if a proper hearing on the motion
430 F.2d at 479 n.10. See also Amanuensis, Ltd. v. Brown, 65
N.Y.S.2d 11 (1971) where the court held violative of due process
N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 302-a(3)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1972)

was denied. See
Misc. 2d 15, 318
the requirement in
that before a ten-

ant may show that the premises are substandard as a defense to an action for possession based on nonpayment of rent, the tenant must deposit into court the amount of
rent sought to be recovered.
103. 430 F.2d at 484.

104.

Id.

105.

This might be shown by the tenant offering the testimony of a housing reg-
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would be appropriate, for in such a case it is fairly certain that the court
ultimately will set a reasonable rental value which is lower than the contract rate.
Nevertheless, implementation of this procedure, although followed
in Hinson, possibly is beyond the authority of California courts. Code
of Civil Procedure section 572 authorizes a court to order a deposit
into court, upon motion, only "when it is admitted by the pleadings, or
shown upon the examination of a party to the action, that he has in
his possession, or under his control, any money. . being the subject
of litigation . . . which belongs or is due to another party. . .. "101
The prerequisites to the issuance of such an order have been strictly
adhered to. As stated in Frey v. Superior Court,0 7 it is essential "that
the party from whom the payment is asked has no right or title to
hold the money, and that it belongs or is due another."1 08 Furthermore, a court will not require a litigant to surrender his property to
another, or for his benefit, until there has been a judicial hearing and
determination that he has no right to such property.10 9
Thus, in ordering a tenant to pay rent into court it appears first,
that there must be a preliminary hearing on the merits of the case, and
second, that a court cannot order the tenant to pay a greater amount
into court than he is shown to owe the landlord. It also has been
held that if the money to be deposited into court is not the subject of
the litigation, but its payment is a mere incident thereto, dependent
upon the judgment to be rendered, the order to deposit the money into
court is not authorized.1 10 Since the recovery of rent is a mere incident of an unlawful detainer action to regain possession,'
it is possible that protective orders may be held to be unauthorized by Code of
ulation enforcement official indicating that the premises are defective. Yet, it should
be noted that an official inspection is not a prerequisite to the defense of breach of
implied warranty of habitability. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071,
1082 n.62 (D.C. Cir. 1970). This conclusion is directly supported by Hinson where
the inspection was not conducted until after the tenant had withheld rent. 26 Cal.
App. 3d at 65, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 662-63. The testimony of an official from the local
enforcement agency is merely evidence of the breach. However, as a practical matter an inspection probably should be requested before trial, as an inspector's testimony,
if favorable, should provide very convincing evidence.
106. CAL. CODE CIrv. PRoc. § 572 (West 1954).
107. 22 Cal. App. 421, 134 P. 733 (1913).
108. Id. at 425, 134 P. at 735.
109. See Green v. Duvergey, 146 Cal. 379, 385, 80 P. 234, 236-37 (1905); In re
Elias, 209 Cal. App. 2d 262, 273, 25 Cal. Rptr. 739, 746-47 (1962).
110. E.g., In re Elias, 209 Cal. App. 2d 262, 273, 25 Cal. Rptr. 739, 746-47
(1962).
111. Lynn v. Cable, 95 Cal. App. 2d 696, 698-99, 213 P.2d 521, 522 (1950);
D'Amico v. Riedel, 95 Cal. App. 2d 6, 9, 212 P.2d 52, 54 (1949); Hennessy v. Gleason,
81 Cal. App. 2d 616, 623, 184 P.2d 913, 918 (1947).
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Civil Procedure section 572, even where a proper hearing has been
held. Thus, although the Hinson court approved the use of protective
orders for the benefit of the landlord, such a procedure may not survive
in California.
A Proposal
Even if California courts determine that it is within their general
equitable power to enter a protective order requiring the tenant to
make the rental payments into court,1 1 the present procedures do not
adequately protect the landlord or the tenant. Although the protective
order insures that the landlord ultimately will receive whatever amount
of rent is determined to be payable to him, he is nevertheless without
rental income during the pendency of the litigation. Without the flow
of rent the landlord may have substantial trouble meeting his financial
obligations and in some situations face foreclosure. Even if the tenant
ultimately prevails, he will nonetheless be obligated to pay some rent,
and so to deny the landlord all rent during the pendency of the litigation seems unduly harsh. 11 3
Also manifest are the disadvantages to the tenant of a protracted
procedure for determining whether the landlord is in breach and if so,
the proper amount of rent due. The tenant primarily is interested in
having the necessary repairs made; but denying the landlord all rent
during the pendency of the litigation makes it less likely that the landlord will be able to afford to make the repairs prior to the conclusion of
the action. Thus, the longer the proceedings take, the more aggravated the tenant's inconvenience.
Many of the disadvantages inherent in the present procedures
could be eliminated in California by establishing local agencies to make
prompt and uniform determinations of whether the landlord is in
breach, the appropriate reduction in rent, and subsequently to ascertain
whether sufficient repairs have been made to justify reinstating the orig4
inal rent.1
112.

In Bell v. Tsintolas, 430 F.2d 474, 482 (D.C. Cir. 1970)

the court stated:

"[W]e have little doubt that the Landlord and Tenant Branch of the Court of General
Sessions may fashion an equitable remedy to avoid placing one party at a severe disadvantage during the period of litigation."

113. A recent study of the unlawful detainer procedure in Oakland, California,
indicated that it takes an average of more than fifty-four days from the initiation of
eviction proceedings to execution of the judgment for possession. LANDLORD-TENANT
INTERVENTION UNIT OF THE OAKLAND POLICE DEPT.,

SMALL CLAIMS COURT AND

THE

URBAN LANDLORD 14 (rough draft, 1972). This delay undoubtedly will be increased
if a tenant asserts the defense of breach of implied warranty of habitability.
114. Comparable agencies exist in other states. For example, in Michigan and
Pennsylvania the local housing regulation enforcement agencies are authorized to cer-
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A tenant seeking administrative review of what he considers substandard premises could contact the proposed local agency and request
that an inspection be conducted to determine whether the alleged violations are substantial-i.e., whether the landlord is in breach of the im-

plied warranty. If substantial violations are found the agency should
then notify both parties of the determination. The tenant could then
request that an official hearing be held to determine the appropriate
reduction in rent and the agency should notify both parties of the time
and place the hearing will be held.

If a tenant chooses to withhold rent as permitted by Hinsoneither with or without first having requested an inspection by the local
agency-the landlord should be permitted to have the agency review
the dispute.1 15 Upon being contacted by the landlord the agency should

conduct an inspection of the premises if one has not been made prior to
the tenant's decision to withhold rent. If the inspection discloses substantial defects, the agency should give notice and conduct a hearing
to determine the proper adjustment of rent."" If, on the other hand,
tify that a dwelling is eligible for rent withholding without judicial intervention. The
rents are then paid into an escrow fund to be used for repairs. When the dwelling
is again certified as fit for human habitation the excess money deposited is paid to
the landlord. In Pennsylvania if the premises are not certified as fit within six months
the money is returned to the tenant. MIcH. CoMA.
LAws ANN. §§ 125.529(1),
125.530(3), (4) (Supp. 1972); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 1700-1 (Supp. 1972). New
Jersey permits local governments to promulgate ordinances that would allow local
housing officials to reduce rent by a limited amount in buildings that are found to be
"substandard." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 42-74 to -84 (Supp. 1972).
New York and Illinois have special statutory procedures that allow social welfare
agencies to withhold rent payments when a building that houses welfare recipients is
dilapidated. N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAw § 143-b (McKinney 1966); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 23, § 11-23 (Supp. 1972). It must be pointed out that in each of these states the
tenant's statutory right to withhold rent or to a reduced rent is dependent upon agency
action. But see N.Y. MuLT. DWELL. LAw. § 302-a (McKinney Supp. 1972) which
permits a tenant to defend an action for possession because of nonpayment of rent
where serious violations of the housing code have occurred.
115. The main difference between the type of agency proposed here and those of
other states is that here the tenant's right to withhold rent is not necessarily dependent upon agency action. This is desirable because if the agency becomes overburdened and as a result functions too slowly, the tenant will not be left without a remedy.
However in cases where th9 tenant is paying rent and seeks a determination of the appropriate rent reduction, the proposed agency does not materially differ from the type
authorized by, for example, the New Jersey statute. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 42-74 to
-84 (Supp. 1972).
116. Absent notice and proper hearing any agency action probably would be
deemed a denial of procedural due process. See note 103, supra. Obviously it is desirable that the parties be notified and the hearing be scheduled as expeditiously as
possible, particularly where the tenant is not paying rent, since the effectiveness of the
proposed agency in alleviating the present problems depends upon its ability to act
quickly.
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the inspection reveals no substantial defects, the tenant should be so
advised; if he persists in withholding rent, the landlord would be entitled to sue for unlawful detainer and the agency findings should preclude the tenant from raising the breach of implied warranty defense.
At the hearing the parties should have the right to give testimony
and to be represented by counsel' 17 to insure that the hearing is conducted fairly.118 Upon the conclusion of the hearing the agency official, when appropriate, should enter a finding of the percentage reduction in use" 9 caused
by the violations and determine the corresponding
20
reduction in rent.'
The agency official should then issue an order requiring the tenant, if he has not been paying rent, to pay the amount of past rent
found due and to begin paying rent to the landlord at the reduced rate,
or if the tenant has been paying rent, an order that he need only pay
rent at the reduced rate. This order would, of course, be reviewable
by the courts. However, if the tenant refuses or is unable to pay the
reduced rent, the landlord should be able to bring an unlawful detainer action for default in rent 121 and the tenant should not be permitted to raise the implied warranty defense unless either the conditions in
the dwelling have changed since the agency determination or the tenant
shows that the agency determination cannot reasonably be sustained. 2
The tenant should not be entitled to a de novo consideration of the
implied warranty defense, since otherwise the efficacy of the adminis23
trative procedure would be greatly impaired.
117. If the tenant does not have the right to be represented by counsel the courts
may hold that the proceedings have no force or effect until the tenant has had an
opportunity for a trial de novo in superior court. See Mendoza v. Small Claims Ct., 49
Cal. 2d 668, 321 P.2d 9 (1958).
118. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 42-77(b) (Supp. 1972), which authorizes local agencies to reduce rent, provides: "Whenever it appears by preliminary investigation
that a multiple dwelling is substandard the public officer shall cause a complaint to be
served upon the owner of and parties in interest in such multiple dwelling, stating
the reasons why said multiple dwelling is deemed substandard and setting a time and
place for hearing before the public officer. The owners and parties in interest shall be
given the right to file an answer and to appear and give testimony The rules of

evidence shall not be controlling in hearings before the public officer."
119.

See text accompanying notes 87-94 supra.

120.

To insure uniformity in the agencies' decisions a list of rent impairing vio-

lations and suggestions for the appropriate percentage reduction in rent should be promulgated by the housing department. See, e.g., N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 302-a
(2) (c) 1 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
121. See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1161(2) (West Supp. 1972).
122. Similarly, if the tenant is paying rent at the reduced rate, the agency determination should be a complete bar to an action for possession.
123. Once the landlord has made the repairs, if the tenant does not begin paying
rent at the agreed rate the landlord should appeal to the local agency for a determina-
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Although the specific details of this procedure need to be worked
out, the advantages of making available an informal forum for the
speedy resolution of rent withholding disputes are numerous. The
burden of making the preliminary inquiry is taken from the courts and
placed where it more properly lies-with a specialized agency responsible for enforcing housing codes. Also, any cash flow problems suffered by the landlord would be reduced to a minimum, thereby decreasing the possibility that the tenant's exercise of his rights would hinder
the landlord's financial ability to make the repairs.
The tenant would benefit from this procedure in another way. A
major drawback of the implied warranty theory is that if in the action
for possession the landlord is found not to be in breach, the tenant's
withholding of rent is considered wrongful and entitles the landlord
to recover possession.' 24 Thus, when a tenant makes the decision to
withhold rent, he risks eviction for nonpayment if his conception of
uninhabitable premises differs from that of the court. Considering the
hardships encountered by many low-income tenants in seeking a new
place to live, the possibility of being evicted for a mistake in judgment
will seriously discourage tenants from exercising their right to withhold
rent when the premises are substandard. However, if an agency is established that can determine quickly whether the premises have become substandard, and if so, the appropriate reduction in rent, it will
not be necessary for a tenant to risk eviction for withholding rent.
Unless a tenant who withholds rent in an erroneous but good faith belief
that the premises are substandard is protected against forfeiting possession when he pays all rent that is found due, 12 5 the need for an
agency similar to the one proposed is magnified greatly. Without the
protective procedures of an agency such as that proposed, the promise of Hinson will be an illusory one for all but a few low-income
tenants.
tion that the premises are in substantial conformance with the housing codes and
that the tenant is obligated to pay rent at the contract rate.
124. Although in Hinson this question was left unanswered, in Javins v. First Nat'l
Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1970), which Hinson apparently follows,
the court stated that if the triers of fact find that no reduction in rent is warranted then
possession shall be entered for the landlord. However, this has been changed by statute
in the District of Columbia, see note 74 supra.
125.

This is essentially the position taken by the UNiFORM RpsiDENTiAL LAND-

& TENANT Aar § 4.105(a), (Final Draft, Aug. 10, 1972), when a tenant defends an action for possession based on nonpayment of rent by showing that the premises are substandard. This position is also in accord with the equitable principle that
the law abhors forfeitures. H. McCLNTocK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY
LORD

§ 33 (2d ed. 1948).

This principle is followed in CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1179

(West 1955) which permits a court to relieve a tenant against forfeiture of a lease,
in case of hardship, upon full payment of rent due. See also, CAL. Crv. CODE § 3275
(West 1970).
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Conclusion
The decision in Hinson v. Delis represents a major break from
the past in California landlord-tenant law. Although one hundred
years ago the legislature imposed a duty to repair on the landlord, the
operation of the common law rules of caveat emptor and independent
covenants stymied the development necessary to insure that this duty
was enforced. The tenant is now armed with an effective weapon,
withholding payment of rent, to compel the landlord to make needed
repairs, or put more bluntly: to compel the landlord to obey the law.
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